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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-3193 
__________ 
 
HOSEA L. FLAGG,  
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil Action No. 3-17-cv-02602) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 21, 2019 
 
Before: MCKEE, COWEN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 27, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Hosea Flagg, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his employment discrimination  
action.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 Flagg filed a complaint against the State of New Jersey, Office of Child Support 
Services (“OCSS”) claiming employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.  OCSS moved to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state a claim for relief and asserted that Flagg had failed to 
comply with basic rules of pleading.   
The District Court granted the motion and allowed Flagg to amend his complaint.    
OCSS moved to dismiss the amended complaint.  Flagg then filed a second amended 
complaint purporting to add four individual defendants.  Flagg claimed, among other 
things, that he was wrongfully terminated based on his age and after he had complained 
about remarks about sexual orientation.  The District Court allowed OCSS to withdraw 
its pending motion and file a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint.   
The District Court granted OCSS’s motion to dismiss the second amended 
complaint with leave to amend Count I, the wrongful termination claim.  The District 
Court stated that Flagg had agreed at oral argument to dismiss all other counts and 
explained that Flagg had not sufficiently alleged the elements of a claim under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (“ADEA”).  The District 
Court stated that it would not review the merits of a claim based on sexual orientation 
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because it found no statements in Count I that could be construed as supporting such a 
claim.  It also noted that Flagg had acknowledged that he was employed by ACRO 
Services Corporation, not OCSS.   
 Flagg filed a third amended complaint against OCSS, which OCSS moved to 
dismiss on several grounds, including sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment.  After a hearing, the District Court granted the motion.  The District Court 
ruled that OCSS is entitled to immunity on Flagg’s claim for age discrimination under the 
ADEA because it is an agency of the Department of Human Services of the State of New 
Jersey.  The District Court noted that it was unclear whether Flagg intended to assert a 
retaliation claim for engaging in protected activity under Title VII and did not review 
such a claim.  Finally, the District Court stated that Flagg had several opportunities to 
cure the deficiencies in his complaint and ruled that further amendment would be futile.  
This appeal followed.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the grant of a 
motion to dismiss under a plenary standard.  Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 
780, 786 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016). 
Flagg contends on appeal that the District Court erred by failing to address his 
claims against the four individual defendants named in his second amended complaint.  
He contends the case should have continued against these defendants or the District Court 
should have dismissed the action against them.  As Flagg appears to recognize, he did not 
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properly serve these individuals when he filed his second amended complaint.  And 
significantly, he did not name them as defendants in his third amended complaint filed 
six months later.  We find no error under these circumstances.1      
Flagg also argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his claim under the 
ADEA based on sovereign immunity, but he has not shown an error in this regard.  See 
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (Congress did not abrogate 
States’ sovereign immunity to suits under the ADEA); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (the Eleventh Amendment proscribes suits against 
States, their agencies, and departments in federal court). 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
                                              
1A docket entry was made advising Flagg after he attempted service of his second 
amended complaint that, if he wished to serve additional defendants, he must request the 
issuance of summonses.  The copy of the docket entry mailed to Flagg was returned to 
the Court, but to the extent he did not learn then of the defect, he had ample time to 
discover it.  OCSS noted service was improper in its motion to dismiss the second 
amended complaint.   
 
